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INTRODUCTION 
Economists have generally relegated a concern for the personal distribu- 
tion of income and wealth to a quite separate and isolated place within the 
discipline. With some exceptions, focus has been placed on questions of 
resource allocation and efficiency, areas in which it was felt that relatively 
"value free" statements could be made. Studies of the personal distribution 
of income have been made, but the distribution of income is usually presented 
as an outcome of the economic system, with little said about the desirability 
of one distribution over another, though perhaps with the tacit understanding 
that a more equitable distribution was "better" than a less equitable one on 
the basis of humanitarian concerns. Since changes in income distribution 
are generally perceived as situations in which some people are made better 
off and others worse off, however, it has always been difficult to lend any 
"scientific" rigor to a ranking of distributions. One had to admit that it is 
operationally impossible to measure in any meaningful way the gains and 
losses actually experienced by different people, and thus be able to determine 
whether the sum of total happiness had been increased or decreased by the 
redistribution. 
To the extent that the distribution of income has been seen to have a 
causal role in determining economic variables, as distinct from being 
determined by them, that role lay in the interrelationship between the 
distribution of income on the one hand and the savings rate on the other. 
The savings rate in turn was a primary determinant of the growth rate of 
output. This view of economic growth has its origins in the work of the 
classical economists who argued that it was the entrepreneurial class, whose 
income was derived from profits, that did most of the saving and investing 
in an economy. Laborers were too poor to have any income left over for 
saving after meeting the needs of subsistence. The rentier class indulged in 
ostentatious living and also saved little. The key t o  rapid expansion of 
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productive capacity, output, and employment was to maximize the share of 
total income that accrued to the entrepreneuria1 class. Greater distributional 
equity, which would increase the incomes of the poor at the expense of this 
class, would reduce savings and hence the growth of output. There was, 
then, a trade-off. Greater inequity today would be rewarded by greater 
output tomorrow; greater equity today would be purchased at the cost of a 
smaller national income tomorrow. Classical economists never considered 
the possibility of a trade-off between output and employment. For them, 
maximum output was consistent with, and indeed, equivalent to a situation 
of maximum employment. 
This model of economic growth is a very simplified one, which leaves out 
many other important variables determining the interrelationships among 
output, employment, and distributional equity. In particular, it focuses only 
on the interrelationship between income distribution and savings and 
between savings and the growth rate of output. But the growth rate of output 
is also determined by the incremental capital output ratio (the amount of 
investment required to expand by one dollar) and the rate of technological 
change. Also, since a large part of the capital goods needed for growth must 
be imported from the more advanced countries that have already developed 
the capacity to produce these goods, the growth rate of output will be influ- 
enced by the ability to export and the extent to which foreign exchange 
resources are used to finance imports of investment goods rather than 
consumer goods. 
Similarly, the rate of growth and the skill structure of employment are 
not simple functions of the rate of growth of output, but depend on the 
composition of that growth, the type of bias in new technologies being 
introduced, and the extent to which labor can be substituted for capital in 
each sector of the economy. Some industries are more labor-intensive than 
others; some use relatively more skilled labor, others more unskilled labor. 
Finally, some industries have access to labor-saving technology; in other 
cases, new technology may have a more capital-saving basis. 
The classical model did not explore the possibiIity that different growth 
strategies, defined in accordance with those sectors and industries which 
grew the most quickly, might have different incremental capital output 
ratios, different levels and biases of technological change, different effects 
on employment, different levels of exports, and different levels of imports 
of consumption goods. Nor did they explore the interrelationship between 
thedistribution of income and the pattern of growth that was likely to emerge. 
It is quite clear, however, that the pattern of growth will reflect the 
distribution of income. The pattern of private investment and production 
will be responsive to the structure of effective demand. If the income distri- 
bution is highly skewed in favor of the rich, then resources will be devoted to 
such items as automobile production, U. S. franchised food establishments, 
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and other industries producing goods and services needed to sustain the 
Western-oriented life styles of the high income groups. Exports will be used 
to finance luxury consumer goods and investment goods needed to produce 
these consumption goods and services domestically. Despite the fact that 
much of this production might seem frivolous in comparison to the needs of 
the majority of the people for a decent diet, shelter, clothing, sanitation, 
and medical care, the fact is that the poor do not have the income to make 
their needs felt in the marketplace. 
While public investment need not respond to market forces and could be 
directed toward building the capacity to produce goods and services con- 
sumed by low income groups, in general this does not happen. In the first 
place, the distribution of political power generally reflects the distribution 
of income. Hence public expenditures often reflect the need for public 
services by the higher income groups. In addition, however, the pattern of 
development that is based on the consumption patterns of the higher income 
groups, a pattern which emphasizes urban development and large-scale 
industrialization, requires a substantial investment in relatively large capital- 
intensive projects such as electric power generation and modern transport 
facilities. In most cases, only the government has access to the quantity of 
capital necessary to finance these investments or is willing to take on the 
risks of such projects where the initial investment can be recovered only in a 
relatively long period of time. After meeting these needs, the government 
typically has few resources available for other uses. 
The argument for neglecting the effects of the changes in the structure of 
output on the growth of output and employment and on'income distribution 
is that, whatever the structure, benefits will filter down to provide more 
employment and income to the vast majority of the people. But this view 
neglects the fact that the extent to which benefits filter down is a function of 
the pattern of growth. The poor will benefit more when expansion occurs in 
industries utilizing reIatively large amounts of unskilled labor rather than 
in industries employing relatively small amounts. Further, output will grow 
at a faster rate when expansion occurs predominantly in industries using 
relatively little capital and imported inputs. Thus different development 
strategies can have different effects on employment, equity, and growth of 
output. An important issue is the extent to which the interrelationship 
among these variables counteracts or eliminates the classical trade-off 
between growth and equity. 
Aside from the theoretical complications involving the interrelationships 
among equity, employment, and output, there is the empirical experience of 
some twenty-five years of concerted development effort by the developing 
economies and the aid-giving nations. The results of this experience are not 
encouraging. Large groups in most developing countries have been un- 
touched by the massive efforts undertaken there. Unemployment and income 
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inequalities have been increasing in many countries, producing political and 
social pressures that are on a scale unprecedented in world economic develop- 
ment. Therefore, the search for a better understanding of the determinants 
of emp!oyment, output, and distribution has an immediacy independent of 
scholarly interest. In particular, it is important to know to what extent these 
goals must be traded off with one another and whether there are alternative 
policies and strategies that would eliminate or reduce the trade-offs. 
THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN GROWTH AND EQUITY 
Before looking at the effect of economic structure on growth and equity, 
one should consider a more conventional neoclassical argument that focuses 
on the short-run as distinct from a long-run situation. 
One crucial assumption implicit in the classical theory is that all resources 
are being employed efficiently. It is this assumption which creates the trade- 
off between equity and output; more income for the poor must be accom- 
panied by less for the rich-hence, less savings and less output growth. As 
Wayne Thirsk argues in this volume, however, most developing economies 
are characterized by serious inefficiencies in resource use so that it is, in 
principle, possible to have both greater equity and more output if those 
inefficiencies can be reduced. The qualification is important since most of 
the inefficiencies result from price distortions that benefit the privileged 
groups-the very groups which, in large measure, control economic policy 
in these countries. Also, the relaxation of the equity-output trade-off will 
only be temporary. Once resource use becomes efficient, we will return to 
the long-run world where the trade-off of the classical theory will hold. 
While Thirsk illustrates his argument in the context of the agricultural 
sector, it applies equally to policies affecting the industrial sector. Consis- 
tently one finds that tax, trade, foreign exchange, and commercial policies 
are constructed so as to subsidize and encourage the use of capital a t  the 
expense of the overabundant factor of production, labor. As a result, scarce 
savings are not efficiently used to maximize the increase in output; and 
actual output increases are less than they could be, given those resources. 
The choice of capital-intensive modes of production also leads to relatively 
less employment generation, given the increase in output, and the new 
employment often favors the scarce workers with technical skills rather than 
those in most need, who have few skills. 
It should be pointed out that even in a world of unfettered competition 
the use of labor in developing economies would be discouraged. Even though 
unskilled labor is greatly underemployed and in some cases unemployed so 
that, from a social point of view, it has zero cost (its employment would not 
decrease output in any other part of the economy), individuals will not work 
and forgo leisure unless they are paid a positive wage. Since employers 
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must pay this positive wage they will base their hiring decisions on it rather 
than on the true social cost of zero. Hence they will hire fewer workers than 
is socially efficient. Also, although labor is abundant, it is truly unskilled 
labor, lacking even rudimentary experience with an industrial system. 
Finally, since labor-intensive production processes obviously require a 
relatively larger supervisory and managerial staff than more capital-intensive 
modes, the latter are often favored because of the extreme shortage of 
supervisory personnel. 
In addition to these fundamental problems in the functioning of the labor 
market, there are even more serious difficulties with capital markets, which 
are rudimentary and fragmented. The undeveloped state of capital markets 
means that savings cannot be allocated to their most efficient uses. The 
linkages between savers and investors are so weak that for the most part 
investors are forced to finance their expenditures from their own savings, 
and savers are required either to find profitable investment opportunities on 
their own or to accept rates of interest which are usually less than the rate of 
inflation. In this type of economy the pattern of investment tends to reflect 
the interests of the individuals who have investable resources rather than the 
uses which are most profitable from a social point of view. 
Such structural defects in the labor and capital markets are responsive to 
government policy. Even if policy choices are wisely made, however, im- 
provements in these markets will require a great deal of rime. Unfortunately, 
governments (and aid-giving agencies) do not give sufficient attention to 
long-run solutions. The immediate economic, political, and social pressures 
invariably preoccupy the limited resources of time, thought, energy, and 
money available to policy makers. As a result, very little has been done in 
the past to rectify the more fundamental problems of the factor markets. 
Even if attention is given to these problems now, no immediate and large 
increase in efficiency can be expected in the short run. 
Results can be achieved more readily in the short run by removing the 
distortions in markets and prices that are the result of activist government 
policy. Resisting pressures to increase urban minimum wage rates will 
encourage greater employment, equity, and output. The same can be said 
for the removal of import controls and foreign exchange policies that subsi- 
dize the use of capital. While it is clear, however, that, other things being 
equal, the removal of specific restrictions to the functioning of the market 
will lead to more employment and output, it is less clear that doing so will 
increase the degree of distributional equity. 
The uncertainty with respect to the effect on equity arises from several 
sources. First, one must distinguish between changes in the level of income 
and changes in the distribution of income. Removal of market restrictions 
may lead to an increase in total income and to an increase in the income of 
the poor. Yet it may, in addition, increase the income of the wealthy, and 
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that increase may exceed the increase accruing to the poor. In principle, a 
situation in which everyone has a higher income even though the distribution 
of that income is more unequal should be viewed as an improvement. An 
individual's sense of well-being, however, is often determined by the level of 
his income relative to the incomes of other individuals with whom he has 
some contact. In other words, distribution per se may be an important 
determinant of whether or not one feels better off. In political terms, the 
distribution of gains from growth may be even more important than the 
amount of growth. 
A second factor is that there are very few situations in which a change in 
policy would make everyone better off. Typically, changes in policy will 
make some people worse off. For example, while it is clear that the removal 
or reduction of urban minimum wages would help many low income persons 
by encouraging employers to use more labor, and hence provide more 
employment, those who initially benefited from the minimum wage would 
suffer a reduction in income. An overall index of equality may show an 
increase, but there may be specific individuals who are in, say, the bottom 
half of the income distribution who would be hurt. 
Thirdly, what might be appropriate for the current period may not hold 
for the longer run. For example, removal of restraints on market behavior 
could lead to a situation in which equity is immediately improved, but in 
which there will be even greater inequalities in the future. This situation 
would occur if the policy change increased the incomes of all groups and if 
the high income groups either saved a significantly larger portion of their 
income or received a significantly higher rate of return on their savings than 
the lower income groups. In the long run the distribution of wealth, and 
hence the distribution of income from that wealth, will become increasingly 
unequal. In this example there is no trade-off between output and equity in 
the short run, but in the longer run a trade-off exists because of the growing 
disparities in the ownership of wealth. Other examples of this nature are 
discussed in the next section. 
Theefficacy of an employment and income distribution policy that focuses 
on improving the functioning of markets ultimately rests on how easily 
market distortions can be eliminated and on the response of the economic 
system to changes in various prices. Some problems associated with im- 
proving the operation of markets have been discussed above. They include 
problems of creating market institutions, and the political problems of 
disturbing the status quo. The response of decision makers to price changes 
depends largely on the degree of substitutability of various factors of pro- 
duction in the production process and of various goods and services in the 
consumption patterns of households. The degree of this substitutability is 
controversial and eventually must be settled empirically, To some extent, 
however, the degree to  which one can reIy on responses to  relative price 
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changes is a political as well as a technical problem. For example, even if 
firms could substitute labor for capita1 in large enough quantities to make a 
significant difference in employment, the extent to  which prices of labor and 
capital might have to change in order to induce firms to undertake this 
substitution might not be politically feasible. Similar conclusions hold on 
the consumption side where households are very inflexible in their con- 
sumption patterns. 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, OUTPUT, AND EMPLOYMENT 
As seen in the previous section, the conclusion that greater reliance on 
well-functioning markets will lead to more output, employment, and perhaps 
equity, needs to be qualified in light of the degree of factor substitutability 
in production processes. In a world in which there is underutilized labor and 
limited factor substitutability, and in which different industries use factor 
inputs in different proportions, the level and rate of growth of output and 
employment will be a function of the composition of production. Hence the 
level of employment couId be increased in both the short and long run by 
altering the product mix. 
To see this we need a model which interconnects income (or wealth) dis- 
tribution, consumption patterns, and relative factor intensities. James Land 
and I have constructed such a model, in which we show that under certain 
assumptions, other things being equal, it is possible to have more output and 
employment if income and wealth are more equitably d i~ t r ibu ted .~  Our 
model is based on three assumptions: 1) that low income families tend to 
consume goods and services which on the average are more labor-intensive 
(i.e., use more labor and less capital per unit of output) than high income 
families; 2) that there is limited factor substitutability in the production of 
goods and services (this assumption permits some range of choices involving 
different input combinations, but asserts that there are some binding limits 
on the degree to which labor can replace capital in various production 
processes); 3) that the marginal propensity to  save (the proportion of changes 
in disposable income that is saved) is the same for a11 income classes. 
The logic of the model can be seen as follows. if we consider two income 
groups, the rich and the poor; two factors of production, homogeneous 
labor and capital; two goods, S (simple) goods which are labor-intensive 
and C goods which are capital-intensive; then, if each income class consumes 
the same proportion of an increment in income and the rich spend a higher 
proportion of their income on C goods than do the poor, a transfer of one 
dollar from rich to poor will increase the level of employment. In addition, 
the total level of output produced with the given amount of capital increases 
because the new output mix of C and S goods uses less capital than the 
previous mix.' 
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In this model there is no trade-off between equity and growth, so long as 
the marginal propensity to save is the same for the two income classes. 
Indeed, the pattern of growth that is characterized by a greater degree of 
equity will permit a higher rate of growth of output and employment, since 
each increment in output requires a smaller investment in capital. 
To the extent that the marginal savings propensity of the rich, following 
the classical assumption, is greater than that of the poor, the rate of growth 
in employment and output following redistribution will be smaller than 
where marginal savings propensities were the same. When savings propen- 
sities differ by a relatively large amount, when the difference in the capital 
intensity of C and S goods is relatively small, or when the relative proportion 
in which the two income classes consume the two goods is similar, a case 
develops in which the negative effect on growth rates arising from the reduc- 
tion in savings more than offsets the positive effect of a reduction in the 
overall capital intensity of the product mix. These two effects have been 
labeled the savings effect and the demand-compositional effect. 
The relative importance of the two effects must be settled empirically. It 
is interesting to note, however, that the a priori judgments by economists 
differ considerably. A group of economists, in a report on employment and 
income distribution in Colombia prepared for the International Labour 
Organization, placed the major emphasis on the demand-compositional 
effect, while a model constructed by economists at the World Bank ignores 
this effect entirely and considers only the savings effect.4 Empirical work 
that has been completed to date is discussed below. 
In the context of the theoretical model, the transfer of income could be 
achieved by levying a tax on the rich and transferring the revenue to the 
poor, or by redistributing the ownership of wealth from the rich to the poor. 
In practice, of course, it may not be possible or practical to redistribute 
existing wealth. Rather, policies can be adopted which lead to a different 
distribution of increments to national wealth. These policies can range from 
making education and skill acquisition (human capital) more accessible to 
low income groups, to facilitating changes in the capital market that allow 
the poor to obtain higher returns on their savings. 
Policies that focus on removing price distortions in order to encourage 
the substitution of labor for capital in production will, of course, increase 
output and employment. But the extent to which these variables will increase 
is a function of the possibilities for substitution within each industry. On 
the other hand, policies that focus on increasing the proportion of wealth 
held by the poor can lead to  increased output and employment even if 
substitution within each industry is limited, since reliance is placed on shifts 
in the pattern of consumption and production towards more labor using 
industries. Furthermore, to the extent that equity is a specific policy objec- 
tive, that objective is best achieved by the latter type of policy, which focuses 
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directly on the distribution of wealth, rather than the former, which has a 
more indirect effect on equity. 
To some extent policies designed to  influence the distribution of wealth 
will also serve to stimulate input substitution within firms. For example, 
import licensing procedures that allocate foreign exchange to large-scale 
industrialists for the importation of foreign-made machinery clearly discrim- 
inate against the small-scale entrepreneur in making it more difficult for him 
to obtain capital goods. Removal of licensing would permit small-scale 
firms to expand more rapidly and put more capital in the hands of people 
who are relatively poor. At the same time large-scale firms will be induced 
to economize on capital inpurs when these are no longer subsidized, and will 
seek ways of utilizinglabor where they might previously have used machinery. 
Another example is discussed by Huddle and Ho in their paper in this 
volume. They point out the problems faced by small-scale firms in obtaining 
credit in a system in which banks, because of restrictions on the interest rates 
they can charge for loans, necessarily prefer to allocate credit to large enter- 
prises, which pose a smaller risk. Removal of interest rate ceilings would 
both permit small-scale firms to invest more (by financing the acquisition of 
new capital goods by bank loans) and induce large firms to use less capital, 
and more labor, in their production activities. 
If policy making and implementation were costless, one obviously would 
recommend that governments undertake both kinds of policies. Unfortu- 
nately, policy development and administration require highly skilIed re- 
sources. Furthermore, many policy moves will meet with some political 
opposition, which either Iimits the application of that policy or requires 
resources to overcome it. In either case, governments must make choices as 
to where they will focus their attention. Many will argue, with some justifi- 
cation, that emphasis on market function without a specific focus on income 
distribution has never been given a fair test. Nonetheless, political pressures 
in developing countries seem to be pushing policy initiatives towards ad- 
dressing the equity issue immediately. 
EMPIRICAL WORK 
While the theoretical model outlined in the previous section shows that 
greater distributional equity could be consistent with higher growth rates of 
output and employment, this conclusion rests on several assumptions. These 
include the assumptions that low income groups tend to consume more 
labor-intensive goods and services than higher income groups and that the 
marginal savings propensities of the higher income groups are not signifi- 
cantly higher than those of the lower income groups. 
A great deal of research has been completed on comparing the relative 
labor intensity of consumption patterns of various income c1asses;S relatively 
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little has been done on measuring differential savings propensities. Conclu- 
sions to date tend to support the Land-Soligo hypothesis, that the low 
income groups tend to consume relatively more of labor-intensive goods 
and services, although the support is not unequivocal. 
The most significant change in expenditure patterns as one moves from 
low income to high income families is in the proportion of income spent on 
food. This ratio declines from roughly 50% to 20% for most of the LDCs. If 
one looks at expenditures from changes in income (marginal expenditure 
coefficients) the decline is even greater. In some cases the poor will spend as 
much as 80% of increments to income on food while the richest groups have 
already achieved an excellent diet and will spend very little extra on food 
with increases in income. 
The importance of the different propensities to consume food lies in the 
fact that the production of food is much more labor-intensive (requires more 
labor per unit of output) than many other activities. Hence, when a more 
egalitarian growth strategy is adopted, the composition of consumption and 
output shifts in favor of the agricultural sector, producing significant effects 
on the level of employment of unskilled Iabor and thus reinforcing the 
overall equity of the distribution of income. 
An unexpected result, however, is that the amount of capital required per 
unit of agricultural output is not much lower than in other sectors of the 
economy, so that the shift in output mix does not reduce the aggregate 
capital-output ratio as much as anticipated. Thus although redistribution 
has a very large impact on employment, it has a much more modest effect 
on thegrowth rate of output. 
The apparent paradox of a sector using both more capital and labor than 
other sectors arises because the overall efficiency of agriculture is extremely 
low relative to the efficiency of the others. 
Improving agricultural efficiency thus becomes a key prerequisite to  an 
income-distribution-oriented growth strategy. New agricultural technologies, 
such as new high yielding varieties which are more resistant to disease and 
more responsive to applications of fertilizer and water, are particularly 
important since they are essentially capital and land saving in nature. With 
these technologies redistribution would have a much greater impact on both 
employment and output growth than under traditional technologies. 
The proportion of income spent on non-agricultural goods and services 
also differs among income groups, and changes in the distribution of income 
will change the relative importance of these in total output. These changes in 
the non-agricultural output mix, however, tend to have much less effect on 
total employment or the aggregate capital-output ratio than the shift in 
output composition towards more agricultural output relative to  non- 
agricultural output.6 
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While many economists have attempted to measure the impact of redistri- 
bution on growth via its effect on the aggregate savings rate (the savings 
effect), their methodology suffers from serious conceptual problems and 
hence their conclusions must be discounted. 
The methodology employed is to take cross section data on family income 
and expenditure from a household budget survey and to fit a statistical 
relationship between family income and savings. This relationship is used to 
estimate the effect of different income distributions on personal savings. It 
assumes that these data do, in fact, measure the marginal savings propen- 
sities of various income classes. 
There is a vast literature dealing with the methodological and theoretical 
problems of measuring savings behavior.' Suffice it to say here that, in 
general, the use of cross section data will tend to overstate the inter-income 
differences in savings behavior. At this point, the issue of whether there is a 
negative savings effect of sufficient magnitude to counteract the positive 
effects on growth of the reduced capital-output ratio (which results from a 
shift in the composition of output toward the goods and services consumed 
by the poor) must remain open until further empirical work has been done. 
In addition to the usual problems of measuring marginal savings propen- 
sities, there is another important issue in the context of the less developed 
economies. We have already referred above to the fact that capital markets 
in less developed countries are undeveloped and fragmented so that savers 
have few profitable opportunities to employ their savings. In most countries 
the available opportunities consist of holding one's sacings in cash or in 
bank accounts that typically pay a very low nominal rate of interest con- 
trolled by law, or investing the funds in some form of real capital (land, 
human capital, or plant and equipment). Holding cash or bank deposits 
generally yields a significantly negative rate of return, since the rate of price 
inflation is very much higher than the nominal interest rates paid on these 
assets. On the other hand, not all savers have either the interest or the exper- 
tise necessary to invest in real (as distinct from financial) assets. The result 
is that the return to savings and wealth accumulation, and hence the incentive 
to save, is reduced. Since the lack of profitable savings opportunities affects 
the lower income groups more than the higher income groups, the lack of a 
developed and well-functioning capital market will bias savings decisions in 
a way that reduces the propensity to save by the poor relative to that of the 
rich. The bias is magnified by a standard convention followed by economists 
when measuring consumption and savings, which counts the acquisition of 
consumer durables such as sewing machines, radios, furniture, bicycles, etc. 
(except houses), as consumption rather than investment. Yet all of these 
are durable goods that will produce consumption services over a period of 
several years. That is, these goods, like any investment good, will serve the 
household over a long period of time and not solely in the year in which the 
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expenditure is made. The bias is not critical in a developed economy such as 
the United States where the service income produced by consumer durabIes 
is typically small relative to total family income. (An exception is the retired 
couple whose money income is very small but whose real income is quite 
satisfactory because of the service income produced by the house, car, and 
other durables purchased in earlier years.) For less developed countries, the 
bias is important because the service income is large relative to money in- 
come and because the acquisition of such consumer durables is usually the 
most productive use, given the state of capital markets, for the savings of 
lower income families. Counting the acquisition of consumer durables as 
savings (and investment) and increasing the range of assets as  well as the 
real rates of return available to low income groups will increase the measured 
and real savings of low income groups. These factors further reinforce the 
conclusion that at this point there is no reason to believe that a negative 
savings effect is likely to be significant. 
S U M M A R Y  
This paper has reviewed the issues regarding the interrelationship between 
distributional equity and the growth rate of output and employment in 
developing economies. This issue is one which has been neglected until very 
recently. Classical economists viewed the relationship in terms of a trade-off. 
Greater equity reduced the savings rate and hence the growth of output and 
employment. 
Neoclassical economists, with their emphasis on efficient resource allo- 
cation, have shown that in the short run at least there need not be a trade-off. 
Most developing economies have many market distortions, which lead to 
serious misallocation of resources. By correcting these distortions output 
and employment could be increased. Whether this would always lead to a 
higher degree of distributional equity as measured by some inequality index 
is not always certain, but it is clear that the lower income groups as a whole 
would benefit by having higher real incomes. 
More recent models of development have attempted to incorporate 
income distribution, output, and employment determination more formally. 
Given certain assumptions about the relative factor intensity of consumption 
patterns and marginal savings propensities of different income classes, we 
show that, in contrast to the classical model, greater equity could be con- 
sistent with higher growth rates of output and employment. The empirical 
evidence to date is not definitive but tends to give encouraging support to  
the assumptions made in the model. 
The issues addressed in this paper are of importance t o  the theoretical 
economist who is interested in knowing more about the role that income 
distribution plays in the determination of other economic variables and, 
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conversely, the variables that in turn determine the distribution of income. 
The issues also have an important real world immediacy. The problems of 
poverty and unemployment faced by the developing countries today are 
unprecedented in history. Because of the ever-growing interdependency of 
the countries of the world, problems are of concern t o  the developed nations 
as well. If, in fact, there is a trade-off between growth and equity, the pros- 
pects for solving the problems are bleak, for redistributing today's income 
will only make tomorrow's problem worse. If the trade-off can be avoided, 
then there is some cause for hope. Whether the problems can best be faced 
by focusing on improving the functioning of markets in general or by 
focusing on policies which serve to increase the proportion of wealth in the 
hands of the poor, or most likely, some combination of these (since they are 
by no means independent), is an unsettled question. But at least there are 
some positive and hopeful alternatives available. 
NOTES 
1. The political unrest and eventual downfall of the Ayub Khan government in the late 
1960s in Pak~stan is often contrasted with the relative stability of India. During the 1960s the 
Pakistan economy grew more rapidly than that of Indla. The degree of inequality of distribution 
grew in Pakistan, however, whereas in I n d ~ a  the political rhetoric suggests that inequality was 
reduced. This experience indicates that the degree of equality, at least as perceived by the ma- 
jortty, a more Important than growthper se. 
2. See James W. Land and Ronald Soligo, "Income Dlstribution, Employment, and 
Growth In Labor Redundant Econom~es," Program of Development Studies Discussion Paper 
no. 9, Rice Univers~ty, 1971. 
3. Because of the index number problem it is not possible to say unambiguously that out- 
put increases. Measured in base period prices, however, aggregate output is higher after the 
Income transfer. 
4. See International Labour Office, Towards Full Employment: A Programme for Colom- 
b ~ a  (Geneva: lnternational Labour Organizat~on, 1970), pp. 127-136; and Hollis Chenery, 
Montek S. Ahluwalia, C. L. G. Bell, John H. Duioy, and Richard Jolly, Redrstribulron wlth 
Growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) 
5. Much of thls work has been summarlzed by S o l ~ g o  in "Consumption Patterns, Factor 
Usage and the Dlstribution of Income. A Review of Some Findings," paper presented at  the 
Southern Economic Assoc~ation Meet~ngs In Atlanta, Georgla, November 1974. 
6. lnterest~ng quahf~ca t~ons  to this statement arise when one considers the capital and 
labor requlred to produce capital goods In addition to what is requlred to produce consumer 
goods. This point 1s dtscussed at  some length in Ronald Soligo, "Factor Intensity of Consump- 
tion Patterns, Income Dlstributlon and Employment Growth in Pak~stan," Program of De- 
velopment Studies Discussion Paper 44 (1973), and in "Consumption Patterns, Factor Usage 
and the D~s t r ibu t~on  f Income. A Review of Some Findings." 
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7. For recent surveys of the literature see Raymond F. Mikesetl and James E. Zinser, "The 
Nature of the Savings Functlon In Developing Countries: A Survey of the Theoretical and 
Emp~rical L~terature," Journal of Econonrlc L~terature 5 (March 1973): 1-26; and Robert 
Ferber, "Consumer Econom~cs, A Survey," Journal of Econonr~c Literalure 1 1  (December 
1973): 1302-42. 
